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Indications That The Liability Tide Is Turning...
Following the accident and while in hospital two or three
hours after the crash, the plaintiff’s blood was analysed and found to
have an alcohol of 0.118. That reading placed her well above the
legal limit. The evidence of two expert pharmacologists was that at
the time of the accident the reading would have been higher because,
although she had nothing to drink after the accident, she was in a
state of shock which would have lowered the rate of alcoholic
metabolism and she had lost blood containing alcohol and had it
replaced with alcohol free blood. The defendant’s expert thought
that, at rough guess, her blood alcohol level at the time of the
accident would have been between 0.13 and 0.14.
The plaintiff commenced proceedings against the owner of the
Bargo Hotel and the licensee and managers of the Hotel. Relevant to
the existence and scope of the duty allegedly owed by the defendants
were allegations of breach of duty of care in that, according to the
plaintiff she was lent money by the Hotel that she used to consume a
large amount of alcohol.
The plaintiff had consumed alcohol at five places on the day
of the accident. She had been drinking in the morning. She was at
the Hotel between
1.30 pm and
3.00 pm. She interrupted her drinking at about 3.00 pm to collect her
daughter from school. She then drank at a bowling club between
4.00 pm and
6.00 pm, at the Hotel between 6.00 pm and 7.00 pm and finally, at
about 7.45 pm at the home of her mother-in-law, who saw her open a can
of beer.
The plaintiff conceded in evidence that she understood the
dangers of drinking and driving and the risk she posed to herself and
others. The accident occurred about two kilometres from her
mother-in-law’s house on the way home.
Shortly after arriving at the hotel, the plaintiff borrowed
$50 from the manager of the Hotel. The Court inferred that the
plaintiff used it to buy two or three drinks at the Hotel. |
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The trial judge concluded that the plaintiff was noticeably
affected by alcohol between the period
6.00 pm and 7.30 pm.
However, His Honour did not accept the plaintiff consumed six to eight
drinks during this period because of the opinions expressed by the
expert pharmacologists that, had she done so, she would have been barely
able to walk, let along drive a car.
Further, His Honour was not prepared to conclude that when
the plaintiff left the Hotel “it must have been obvious” that she was
going to drive her own car, particularly as she would be seen leaving
the Hotel in the company of another person.
The plaintiff gave evidence that she drove when drunk and
that she knew that, when she was doing that, she was running a risk of
injuring herself or others. Accordingly, His Honour held that, even if
the Hotel staff knew that she was proposing to drive, this foreclosed
any argument that they would have succeeded in persuading her not to
drive that evening.
His Honour did not believe that either defendant had a duty
to protect the plaintiff from the consequences of her own inebriation
but, if they did, he did not think that the plaintiff’s inebriation had
been proved to have reached the stage where reasonable steps should have
been taken for her safety. He was not satisfied that she had reached
that stage of intoxication where she no longer had the use of her
physical or intellectual faculties such that the Hotel staff were guilty
of a breach of the Liquor Act by supplying her with liquor.
In conclusion, His Honour stated that the law does not
recognize a duty of care to protect person from harm caused by them
becoming intoxicated as a consequence of a “deliberate and voluntary
decision” by them to drink to excess.
Continued....
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